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Abstract
Using household survey data from the recent economically depressed period, we
attempt to identify typical household characteristics by residential type and study
whether households change their residence in different stages of life. We find that the
general trend in residential choice is influenced by their socioeconomic backgrounds.
Multinomial probit estimation results show that the probability of homeownership
is higher in rural areas and increases with the age of household heads, income, and
family size. In contrast, the probability of renting a home increases in urban areas
along with rising mortgage rates. Moreover, despite market imperfection, there is
a significant tendency among people to adjust residential size according to their
needs in different stages of life. Indeed, there is a strong tendency for dwelling size
to increase with household age, but it begins to reduce once households reach the
age of 55. However, because of the small scale of this reduction in the late life-cycle,
we conclude that post-war housing policies were not very supportive of the elderly.
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1 Introduction
A home is one of life’s necessities, and thus, most people consider homeownership at
some point in their life. However, since a home is usually a very expensive and durable
asset, people often confront difficulties in deciding whether or not, and when, to become a
homeowner. Traditionally, the analysis of housing markets seems to have been carried out
at a micro level, but today it has become increasingly important and forms an essential
element in macroeconomic analysis (Leung 2004, Jorda et al. 2016); housing finance
is found to be closely linked with business cycles and financial crises. Therefore, there
are a number of studies investigating what factors indeed affect household decisions on
homeownership (e.g., Moriizumi 1993, Deutsch et al. 2006).
We study the Japanese property market because it is unique in several respects. First,
the market is not as extensive as in Western countries. There is a relatively small sec-
ondary market, with much fewer repeat-buyers. Renovating houses is not as popular as
in other developed countries as the value of buildings becomes almost zero in 20 years
after their establishment and only residential lands remain a significant part of assets.
Partly for this reason, there is no strong tendency to consider purchasing a house as
an investment strategy. Second, whereas there are many types of residences, there is a
stronger preference to live in condominiums in Japan. People opt to live in condominiums
even after marriage, particularly in urban areas, because they are more affordable than
detached houses in the same areas. Furthermore, living in high-rise condominiums often
equipped with modern and luxurious facilities is considered to be a symbol of wealth.1
Against this background, we will generalize household characteristics in association
with homeownership using socioeconomic information available from very comprehensive
household survey data in Japan. Thus, this study is related to the demand side of the
housing market. Whereas costs such as house prices and rents are important factors in
making household decisions, calculating price and income elasticities is not the objective
of this paper.2 Second, we study whether people change homes in different stages of life.
This an important question regarding residential mobility and is relevant when formulating
1See also Horioka (1988) about the unique features of the Japanese housing market including relatively
high prices of houses, the importance of intergenerational transfers, wide regional disparities in housing
conditions, and relatively unavailability of housing loans until the 1960s. Kobayashi (2016) reviews
Japanese housing market policies after World War II.
2This is due to lack of price data by residential type.
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housing policies, considering Japan has become one of the most aged countries in the
world.3
In short, this paper has the following distinguishing elements: First, we use the Na-
tional Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE, Zenkoku Shouhi Jittai Chosa).
This is the most comprehensive household survey in Japan and collects household-level
information on income and expenditure as well as characteristics of each household. In
particular, this dataset enables us to explore more detailed background information about
households than previous studies, and departs from most economic analyses that relied
on a Hedonic equation where home prices are variables of the interest. Second, we ana-
lyze household characteristics during the lost decades—the recent period of low economic
growth and inflation. After the collapse of the bubbles in the financial and real estate
markets in the early 1990s, Japan experienced two decades during which consumers faced
little income growth and price changes. This was also a period when the focus of the
government’s housing policy shifted towards improving housing for the elderly.
Third, as the dataset does not allow us to identify the same households across differ-
ent sampling periods, we analyze household behavior with respect to changing residence
during different life stages by looking into the relationship between dwelling size and
household age. Therefore, this study is related to residential mobility and more generally,
to the level of market perfection. We use a statistical approach called the difference-in-
differences (DID), which is a popular analytical tool to check the effectiveness of public
policies in repeated cross-sectional data. To identify the timing of a reduction in dwelling
size, we propose a recursive estimation method to disentangle age effects into two different
groups in the context of DID. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
use the DID approach in real estate analyses.
2 Literature review
Realizing the importance of housing markets in economic analyses, there are a number of
studies conducted across countries. However, among them, we mostly review literature
directly related to homeownership and residential mobility in Japan where currently, basic
3In 2015, people more than 60 years old accounted for 33.1 percent of Japan’s population, and this
figure was the highest in the world, followed by Italy (28.6 percent) and Germany (27.6 percent).
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needs are often a focus of debate due to the increasing numbers of unemployed young
people and retired people.
Generally speaking, the Japanese market is considered to be less perfect than Western
markets. Consumers were often confronted with liquidity constraints, which was reflected
in high savings until the 1990s. Since people did not have enough access to external
financing, saving for the future was an essential part of life. Presently, there are more
means to borrow money, but the down-payment remains a heavy financial burden to many
consumers. As a result, the average age of homeownership in Japan is higher compared
to other developed countries, and inheritance and bequests are important elements in
the decisions of potential homeowners (Hayashi et al. 1988, Deutsch et al. 2006). The
imperfection of the Japanese housing market is also documented by identifying asymmetric
information among market participants – between buyers and sellers in the secondary
market (Harano et al. 2012) and between private and institutional participants in the
condominium market (Nagayasu 2016). Furthermore, unlike European countries (e.g.,
Germany), the law and taxation system in Japan is very complicated: Japan’s civil law
treats residential land and houses (i.e., building parts) separately, and therefore, different
types of laws and taxation applies to them. This substantially increases the administrative
costs of becoming a homeowner.
Among factors that affect household decisions, the financial standing of potential
homeowners is reported to be important. Henderson and Ioannides (1983) pointed out the
importance of the timing of the receiving of wealth. When a larger portion of wealth is
received at an earlier time in one’s life cycle, it is more likely to own houses. Deutsch et al.
(2006) analyzed causes of the slowdown in the timing of homeownership between 1992 and
2000, and showed that becoming a homeowner was delayed by the poor financial standing
of consumers as well as stagnant macroeconomic conditions. Similarly, Moriizumi and
Naoi (2011) showed that unemployment risks affected the timing of homeownership in
Japan. The effect of unemployment risks on homeownership is reported to be greater
than that of income variation.
Furthermore, Horioka (1988) and Moriizumi (1993) studied price and income elasticity
in the Japanese housing market. Using household information (the Consumer Expenditure
Survey), Moriizumi calculated the price and income elasticities from the tenure choice
4
function for homeowners and borrowers. Focusing on young households in Tokyo, she
found that the price and income elasticities of becoming homeowners are marginal, and
so is the income elasticity of rental housing demand, leading her to conclude that income
transfers to encourage people to purchase homes is not an effective housing policy.
Household decisions are also known to be influenced by social backgrounds. Borsch-
Supan et al. (2001) studied household data for Germany and Japan (1988 and 1993)
using a multinomial logit (MNL) model. They considered housing prices, household in-
come, and family size, and found that a 10 percent increase in permanent income raises
homeownership by 2 percent, and so does a large family. Furthermore, the household age
is reported to be an important factor for homeownership in both countries. Thus, they
confirm internationally the importance of socioeconomic factors in explaining housing
demand.
With respect to changing residence, theoretical developments have been made, for
example, by Artle and Varaiya (1978) and Henderson and Ioannides (1993, 1989). Hen-
derson and Ioannides (1989) reported that households with higher income and education
are generally more mobile in the USA, and discussed that a decision to rent or own houses
is determined largely by the life cycle of household heads. Seko and Sumita (2007) studied
the effectiveness of public policies in Japan and confirmed that both tax reduction and
amendments in the Rental Act to overprotect borrowers resulted in residential mobility.
Moreover, based on survey data conducted in Kanto region (areas surrounding Tokyo),
Ishikawa and Fukushige (2015) suggested that improved access to public transportation,
shopping areas, and medical facilities becomes motivations to move houses. Using the
1993 data on metropolitan regions, Seko (2000) showed that the decisions of the elderly
to purchase residences were influenced by household size and whether the households al-
ready owned a residence; for example, those in rental residences tend to choose the same
option. On the other hand, Kobayashi and Yukutake (2008) reported from data in 1993,
1998, and 2003 that households in the Tokyo area tend to rent residences initially and
purchase later in life.
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3 Survey data
We use household survey data from the National Survey of Family Income and Expen-
diture (NSFIE, Zenkoku Shouhi Jittai Chosa), which has been conducted every five
years since 1959 to gather the most comprehensive and detailed information related to
household financial status, including income and expenditure, as well as social back-
ground. Furthermore, this survey covers an entire country, which is more comprehensive
geographical coverage than previous studies (Seko 2000, Kobayashi and Fukutake 2008,
Ishikawa and Fukushige 2015) and is designed to exclude identical persons across different
surveys.
Although there is a long history of the data compilation, household-level information
in the NSFIE is disseminated to the public for only four years: 1989, 1994, 1999 and
2004.4 We use household information for 1994, 1999, and 2004 (about 50,000 households
each year); the 1989 household data lack the consistency in the data definition of other
years. Since the financial and real-estate bubbles collapsed in the early 1990s, our data
capture the economic activities of households in the post-bubble period.
This is a period of economic depression and low inflation, with a number of crises
originating both in Japan and overseas. The Great Hanshin earthquake, the second
worst earthquake in Japan in the 20th century, took place in 1995, incurring casualties of
more than 6000 people. Furthermore, large Japanese financial institutions (e.g., Yamaichi
Securities and the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank) collapsed in 1997/98, and the Asian Fi-
nancial Crisis occurred in Thailand in 1997. As a result, profound non-performing loans
were widespread across banks in Japan, and banks’ lending activities were constrained by
severe screening criteria implemented for new investments. This lending practice partic-
ularly damaged the business performance of small- and medium-size firms that employed
over 99 percent of the labor force in Japan. A sluggish investment resulted in a slow
economic growth nationwide and rendered Japan’s employment security fragile, and the
life-time employment system that supported the economic miracle had collapsed. The
slow economic recovery meant the stagnation of household income, and thus, consumers
4Owing to the regulation set by the data provider (the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communica-
tions), the confidential data used in this study cannot be passed on to the third party, but are available
for purchase from the provider.
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were constrained to not spend, with a precautionary motive.5 At the same time, weak
private consumption resulted in a bad spiral where firms did not find strong demand for
the products, and thus, there existed no opportunity for a large-scale investment.
The NSFIE classifies the household choice regarding residential type (RT) into 7 cat-
egories: 1) own home, 2) home rented from the private sector, 3) home rented from local
governments, 4) home rented from public corporations (Kodan) or government agencies
(Kosha), 5) home rented from an employer (Shataku or Komuninjutaku), 6) rented
residence provided by companies, and 7) house shares. As can be seen from this clas-
sification, there are many rental options, and it is quite common for households to rent
a residence through employers because those properties are more reasonable in terms of
payments and administrative costs (e.g., without finding a guarantor or paying a deposit).
In contrast, RT2 is probably the most expensive rental option for households, but this
category includes very modern and fashionable houses and condominiums.
The description and basic statistics of key data are reported in Table 1. Several types
of residence are identified in the dataset, and more than 70 percent of households were
homeowners in 1999 (Figure 1), which is higher than the percentage reported in pre-
vious studies (e.g., Nagayasu 2016). In addition, we have collected architectural areas
(Nobeyukamenseki) of houses, and consumer characteristics such as household age, an-
nual income, family size, savings, occupation type, gender, residential location, and the
number of workers in the family. The last three are binary variables; notably, households
with two or more workers have a value of “1”, and are expected to be in a more sound
financial position. Similarly, females are identified as “1” under Gender, and metropolitan
areas as “1” under Metro.
The demographic structure suggests that most household heads (nearly 13 percent)
are aged between 50 and 54, and two-person households are the most common family
size (Figure 1). Employees in the private and public sectors are the most typical occupa-
tional type, and equally important is family business that includes farmers and fishermen.
Furthermore, the distribution of both annual income and saving is skewed to the right
(Figure 2), with an average of around 7 million yen and 14 million yen, respectively. The
shape of the distribution implies that the majority of people are less wealthy than what
5The consumption tax (VAT) was increased from 3 to 5 percent in 1997.
7
the average statistics indicate.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of properties such as the establishment date,
residential type, and equipment in houses, based on the 1999 survey. In addition to nation-
wide statistics, residential characteristics are shown by geographical location (metropoli-
tan and non-metropolitan areas). This geographical distinction follows that of the gov-
ernment and is determined by population size. This table shows that the average estab-
lishment date of houses is around 1981 (i.e., 18 years old) and houses in metropolitan
areas were constructed slightly more recently. Furthermore, the proportion of detached
and wooden houses is higher in non-metropolitan areas. The houses in non-metropolitan
areas are less frequently equipped with flush toilets, and have less access to piped town
gas. In contrast, almost all houses are equipped with a bath or shower regardless of
geographical location.
Table 3 shows the financial status of households by residential type. This status is ex-
pressed in terms of income, savings, and debt. The income is the total amount of all types
of actual earnings, and savings include deposits in financial institutions, life and non-life
insurance, stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. The debt comprises loans from financial
institutions, employers, mutual benefit associations (unions), as well as borrowing from
relatives and friends. According to this table, the wealthiest in terms of annual income
are homeowners, followed by those renting residences provided by companies. Further-
more, wealthy households are also ones who possess large amounts of personal savings.
The large amounts of savings for homeowners may also reflect our definition of savings,
which includes savings for business of self-employed households (Kojineigyo). Similarly,
there is a tendency for households with high income and savings to have a high level of
debt, reflecting that high earners are considered to be more credible and can obtain large
personal loans more easily.
4 Household characteristics on homeownership
4.1 Household characteristics by residential type
As shown in Table 1, there are many types of residence that households can choose, and
thus, the first question is what socioeconomic factors households in a particular type of
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residence exemplify. Because household decisions are recorded in the dataset by residential
type, we use a multinomial probit (MNP) model where the dependent variable represents
discrete choices. The MNP is a useful analytical method when there are multiple outcomes
that do not have a meaningful order. The MNP is known to have a number of advantages
over the multinomial logit (MNL) model; particularly, it relaxes independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) assumed in the MNL (Train 2009).6 However, the MNP with a great
deal of household information requires heavy computation and thus has rarely been used
in the past. Indeed, Borsch-Supan et al. (2001) study homeownership in Germany and
Japan using the MNL. Presently, developments in IT allow us to use the MNP.
In the latent variable framework, the MNP for the jth alternative of household i can
be expressed as
νij = ziαj + ξij (1)
where j = 1, ..., J . One can interpret νij as utility caused by opting for choice j, and zi is
a matrix of observed variables. Eq. (1) can be derived from economic theories of utility
maximization. A household will chose jth alternative, when νij > νik, rather than kth
alternative (j 6= k).
νij − νik = zi(αj − αk) + ξij − ξik (2)
Or
νk˜ = ziαk˜ + ξk˜
where, unlike the MNL, ξk˜ ∼ MVN(0,Σ) and xk˜ = xj − xk. On the other hand, the
probability that household i chooses the kth alternative is7
Prob(i chooses k) = Prob(νk˜ ≤ 0) (3)
As Eq. (2) suggests, empirical results from the MNP are interpreted in a relative
sense; in other words, the probability of a particular choice is evaluated in comparison
with a benchmark choice. Here, for identification purposes, the baseline alternative, α1
(i.e., homeowners) is constrained to be equal to zero.
6However, the IIA is found to be particularly not restrictive in many applications (Dow and Endersby
2004).
7Also see Appendix for further explanations.
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To explain the selection of RT, we have chosen explanatory variables based on previous
studies, which comprise household characteristics such as household age, gender, family
size, and residential location, as well as financial factors, such as household income and
savings. In addition, we consider the number of other working family members as a proxy
for extra family wealth. Some variables (e.g., gender, household savings, and the number
of other workers in a family) have not been considered in previous research. But, they
are believed to be important for household homeownership decisions; for example, Artle
and Varaiya (1978) discussed that age and present wealth (savings) are more relevant
to household decisions than current income. The use of the NSFIE makes it possible to
expand the dataset.
We expect the following relationships between residential type and the explanatory
variables: First, we assume that wealthy households tend to own houses, and thus a
higher value of all the financial factors (i.e., household income, savings, and the number
of workers in the family) will lead to choosing RT1. Given Japan’s salary system, high
earners in a particular year are assumed to earn a similar amount in the future also, during
our sample period. Thus, high income earners in our dataset can also be interpreted as
high permanent income earners, considered to be more relevant in studies on consumption
(i.e., the permanent income hypothesis).
With respect to household characteristics, we expect that older household heads are
more likely to own a house since they are less likely to face liquidity constraints. Similarly,
consumers in rural areas are expected to have purchased a house, since these regions are
relatively more spacious and provide more affordable homes with a similar configuration
and equipment. Large families obviously need a large residence to accommodate their
many members, and thus, other things being constant, they tend to own houses that are
often not available as rental properties.
Our results show that the explanatory variables are often significant in characterizing
household decisions. Table 4 shows that parameter estimates for age, income, family size,
savings, and number of workers in a family are all generally negative and statistically
significant. If a household age increases, renting from the private sector is a less likely
option compared to a choice of owing a house (the reference option). Similarly, large and
wealthy households are less likely to opt for renting from the private sector. On the other
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hand, females and households in urban areas tend to live in homes rented from the private
sector rather than own houses. However, females have a tendency to avoid other types
of rental properties (i.e., renting from or through employers) since these properties are
typically old-fashioned and may lack adequate security systems. Among the determinants,
household income exercises maximum influence over a household’s choice of the housing
type. This finding is in contrast to theoretical predictions of Artle and Varaiya (1978);
however, it is consistent with Japan’s assessment criteria used by banks for housing loans;
annual salary is one important factor in determining the size of bank loans.
We also report the marginal effects of explanatory variables in Table 5. The statistics
in this table provide information about changes in the probability to choose a particu-
lar residential type in response to, for instance, increases in household income. There-
fore, this table shows that a one-percentage increase in income will increase RT1 by
13.5 percent while reducing the likelihood of selecting other options (0.135-0.099-0.001-
0.054-0.005+0.024+0.000=0.000). Exceptions are RT6 (rented accommodation provided
by companies) and RT7 (renting share houses). Indeed, household decisions to choose
share houses are only marginally affected by our determinants, which makes share houses
a unique residential choice in Japan. Similarly, the likelihood of owning a house increases
as consumers become older and wealthier, and is higher when household heads live in
rural areas. In addition, large families typically own houses, and when there exists more
than one employed person in a family, there is a higher likelihood of owning a house.
Among these characteristics, income is the most critical element in consumers’ decision
to become homeowners. Therefore, our results generally confirm the fact that the financial
situation was one of the important factors for household decisions during the bubble period
(Borsch-Supan et al. 2001), remains unchanged even during the post-bubble periods.
However, compared with the results from the bubble period in previous studies, the role
of income has become more important during the post-bubble period.
In contrast, these determinants often have the opposite impact on households’ renting
properties. For example, renting from the private sector is popular for younger and less
wealthy households, residing in urban areas in particular. Furthermore, rental homes are
a popular choice among small families where no one else apart from household heads is
employed.
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4.2 Purchasing or renting houses
More generally, households may first face a simpler question of whether to purchase or
rent a residence, rather than choosing a residential type in details. Therefore, using the
standard binary probit model, this section provides a broader picture of household char-
acteristics by residential type than the previous subsection. By simplifying the statistical
model, we can also characterize households by occupational type (see Table 1).
Results from the standard probit model, where homeowners are identified as 0 and
borrowers (i.e., RT2—7) as 1, are summarized in Table 6. This table reports both param-
eter estimates and marginal effects, which are calculated using the maximum likelihood
estimation method. In addition to the economic determinants considered in previous sec-
tions, our probit specification includes a mortgage rate that is obtained from Datastream
as well as occupational information. During our sample, the average mortgage rate re-
mains at a historic low and is in a declining trend from 4.133% in 1994 to 2.375% in 2004.
It is expected that a higher mortgage rate that increases financial burden on homeowners
leads to a higher demand for rental properties.
We find that household age, income, family size, savings, gender, and the number
of workers other than household heads are found to be negatively correlated with our
dependent variable. It follows that older, wealthy, and male household heads with other
working family members tend to be homeowners, and so do individuals living in rural
areas. This seems to confirm again that the financial position of a household is important
in deciding whether to purchase or rent a residence in Japan, in line with the findings of
Henderson and Ioannides (1989). In addition, the importance of social factors is consistent
with our findings from disaggregate data in the previous subsection. Similarly, consistent
with theoretical predictions, the mortgage rate has a positive parameter, indicating that
households tend to select the rental option when mortgage rates increase.
However, it is interesting to note that when households are given a choice in housing
options (i.e., renting or purchasing residences), gender differences have diminished over
years, consistent with modifications to the civil law to grant more rights to spouses. Ac-
cording to our disaggregate analysis reported in Tables 4 and 5, this result is attributable
to the choice of renting from public corporations, which was designed to provide middle-
income families with various types of residences often located near shops, banks, and post
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offices.
We also find differences in homeownership by occupational type. Many parameter
estimates for the occupational dummy variable are found to be negative, implying that
many households prefer owning a house, regardless of occupational type. Given that the
dummy variable for private company employees (i.e., Occupation 1) is equal to zero, in
1994, more public sector employees and the unemployed tend to have opted for renting
properties than private company employees.
However, in recent years, people from a greater variety of occupations tend to choose
the rental option; consequently, occupational differences have been diminishing in recent
years, as the number of insignificant occupational parameters doubled during 1994—2004.
One notable exception is public sector employees who exhibited a significant preference
to the rental housing, but only in 2004. This trend appears to be because much public
housing, established more than 20 years ago, became obsolete; the government could not
afford replacing them with new residences or renovating the existing ones due to public
debt.
5 Life-cycle and dwelling size
5.1 The inverse-U relationship
Do people change residence according to their needs? Previous studies reported that
consumer decisions to change residence are influenced by public policies as well as by
the financial standing of consumers. Henderson and Ioannides (1989) showed that the
likelihood of residential mobility is high in the USA as households are wealthier and pos-
sess higher education. Seko and Sumita (2007) suggested that the income tax deduction
scheme for homeowners (2004) encouraged homeownership; furthermore, a legal frame-
work (the Rental Act) to protect borrowers from eviction and unusual increases in rental
fees have contributed toward residential immobility in Japan.
More generally, homeownership was analyzed in the context of life-cycle by Artle
and Varaiya (1978). Generally, we expect people to change dwelling size according to
the different stages of life. Married couples likely live in a larger residence than single-
person households, and couples with children need even larger houses than couples without
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children. However, when children grow up and become independent, the couples no longer
require houses as large as before, and older couples may find it difficult to maintain a
large residence. As the demand functions for own homes and rented properties are very
similar (Henderson and Ioannides, 1989), we expect an inverse-U shaped relationship
between household age and property size, regardless of dwelling type. Thus, this analysis
is relevant particularly to aging societies such as Japan, which have a high proportion
of elderly and nuclear families in the country.8 Indeed, we can observe evidence of the
hump-shaped relationship between dwelling size and household age in our data (Figure
3); however, this figure shows that the shape of this relationship is asymmetric with little
reduction in dwelling size in the late life stage, indicating limited residential mobility.
A Bayesian hierarchical model is used here to prove this relationship formally. The
Bayesian statistical approach can be used to analyze complicated models that cannot be
estimated by the frequentist approach (e.g., by maximum likelihood). Therefore, it has
become a very popular analytical tool in all academic fields. The hierarchical model is one
of such complex models, where the data are classified into three groups (j) in this analysis,
as we have observations for three different years. The choice of year as a grouping variable
is a natural candidate since household decisions may vary over time due to socioeconomic
shocks specific to the given year.
More precisely, for classifying households (i) into j groups, the following two-level
random model is considered.
yij = a+ bxij + uj + eij = bxij + fj + eij (4)
where y is the average architectural area (dwelling size) of the residence having household
heads in the same age group. Since there is no identification of individuals across the
surveys, we conduct the analysis using the dwelling size of age groups (AG) and assume
that changes in the dwelling size indicate a change of residence.9 x is a vector of house-
hold characteristics that can be reasonably assumed to be exogenous in our setting and
includes the extra variable Age2 (Age×Age), since we expect a non-linear relationship
8Takats (2012) reports a significant relationship between demography and house prices in a panel of
advanced countries.
9In case of condominiums, the common area among residents is excluded from the calculation of
architectural areas.
14
between architectural areas and consumers’ age as described by an inverse-U shape. The
uj is a random effect assigned to each time period, and i represents household. There-
fore, our specification accommodates variations in the constant term that are specific to
group j. Generally, using the Bayesian theorem, the posterior distributions (prob(θ|y))
of parameters of interest (say θ) can be expressed as a function of the prior distribution
(prob(θ)) and the likelihood function (prob(y|θ)).
prob(θ|y) ∝ prob(y|θ)p(θ) (5)
To estimate this equation using the Bayesian method with Gibbs sampling, we make the
following assumptions for the prior distributions for the parameters:
a ∼ N(0, 10000)
b ∼ N(0, 10000)
eij ∼ N(0, 100)
fj ∼ N(0, 100)
σ20 ∼ IG(0.01, 0.01)
σ21 ∼ IG(0.01, 0.01)
where parameters a, b, e, and f are assumed to follow a normal (N) distribution and the
variance an inverse-gamma (IG) distribution. Because we do not have any information
regarding the parameters, we assume a fairly large variance, which makes our priors close
to uninformative distributions. The Gibbs sampling is conducted with 45,000 iterations
and a burn-in size of 15,000, which seem to yield reasonable samples of the key parameters,
which are well-mixed and converge (see Figures 4 and 5).
Table 7 summarizes the posterior distribution of parameters from the full-sample anal-
ysis. First, we have found that results from the hierarchical model are similar to those
from the linear model. There is a positive relationship between architectural area and
household age (Age), and this relationship is significant in the sense that the 95% confi-
dence interval does not include zero. It follows that people tend to live in larger houses as
they become older. Thus, despite the number of imperfections in the Japanese property
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markets (Hayashi et al. 1988, Deutsch et al. 2006, Harano et al. 2012, Nagayasu 2016),
there is a strong tendency for people to change houses in different life stages.
However, this investigation based on Age does not provide complete information about
the inverse-U relationship that suggests that the architectural area increases along with
household age but declines when household heads become very old. In this regard, it
is Age2 that contains additional information about the exact shape of this relationship;
the theoretical relationship needs a negative parameter value for Age2 whereas that of
Age may be insignificant in the full-sample analysis. As expected, we find that there
is a negative relationship between Age2 and the architectural area (Table 7). It thus
provides some favorable evidence for the inverse-U relationship. However, given that the
coefficient of Age is positive and has a large impact on the dwelling size, our results give
evidence of a very weak form of the inverse-U relationship, where the peak of the curve
may correspond to the most senior group. To ensure that dwelling size is statistically
smaller for the elderly and identify the turning point in life cycles, we analyze our data
using the DID method.
5.2 Difference-in-Differences
The difference-in-differences (DID) has been widely used to analyze the effectiveness of
public policies. An earlier pioneered work by a prominent epidemiologist (John Snow
1855) used the DID to identify sources of the cholera outbreak in London in 1854. He
considered drinking contaminated water as the main source of the transmission and com-
pared death rates in regions where water was provided by different companies. In eco-
nomics, DID is used to study the effectiveness of public programs in labor, health and
development economics, among many others. For example, Card and Krueger (1994)
investigated the effect of minimum wage policies on employment in the USA.
In repeated cross-sectional data like ours, where we cannot trace the same house-
holds across surveys conducted in different periods, the DID serves as a useful statistical
approach for investigating if residential size generally drops at a later stage of a life cy-
cle. Here, we use young household groups as control groups that are expected to exhibit
steady increases in architectural areas and use older households as treatment groups that
are expected to reduce the residential size. However, unlike the application of a standard
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DID, we do not have the exact information to classify households into two groups (e.g.,
experiment and control regions). Furthermore, since the timing of retirement may differ
by individual households, we estimate the DID with different combinations of control and
treatment groups using the recursive method.10
For household i, the determinants of architectural size (yist) can be studied using the
DID with age group (AG) and time (Time) variables.
yist = α + γAGs + λTime + δ(AGs ∗ Time) + βxit + ist (6)
where AG denotes the age group that classifies our observations into the control
(AGs = 0) and treatment (AGs = 1) groups. As we are unfamiliar with the exact
definition of young and old household groups, different combinations of control and treat-
ment groups are considered by changing the threshold age (AG6 to AG11). The other
explanatory variables are included in xit that captures household-specific elements. Greek
letters are the parameters that are estimated, and the residual ist ∼ N(0, σ2). Time is
a binary variable, with zero for 1994 observations and one for 2004. Initially, we study
changes in the residential size between 1994 and 2004 since household decisions related to
real estate normally take a long time. However, we also study changes in the residential
size between 1994 and 1999 to check the robustness of our findings.
An examination of whether the dwelling size has declined after households reach a par-
ticular age can be performed through the parameter δ that summarizes the effectiveness of
an intervention, which, in this study, is expected to occur due to retirement and the death
of partners, among others. The negative δ indicates that older people live in relatively
smaller houses. Conversely, when δ > 0, it becomes evident that people have enlarged
houses. The other parameters, γ and λ, measure differences in residential size between
control and experimental groups and increases in residential size over time, respectively.
Table 8 summarizes ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the DID with robust
standard errors. By using 1994 and 2004 observations, our results show that households
started to reduce residential size when they reached the age of more than and equal to AG
8 (i.e., AG>7). AG8 denotes people aged between 55 and 59 years, which is considered
10We assume a parallel trend in the control and treatment groups before an intervention event like
retirement. This assumption is reasonable because all the households live in the same (relatively homo-
geneous) country and period.
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retirement age in many firms. Our results also provide evidence that households have a
significant tendency to increase the residential size up to AG7 (δ > 0), indicating that
old households defined here still include many young households. This result is consistent
with our previous analysis reported in Table 7.
Other determinants of dwelling size have expected signs. For example, wealthy and
large families tend to live in large residences, other things being equal. Parameters of
financial wealth variables (i.e., income, savings, and the number of workers) and family
size are all positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, households in metropolitan
areas and with female heads tend to live in smaller residences. These results remain the
same even when we analyze changes in dwelling size in the observations in 1994 and 1999
(Table 8).
Finally, we check if our results are sensitive to residential places. Here, the exercise is
conducted separately for metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas (Table 9), by dropping
Metro in the specification used for Table 8. The results remain similar among regions;
again, the evidence of a reduction in dwelling size is provided for the age of more than
and equal to AG 8, in both regions. But, there is weak evidence that households in non-
metropolitan areas, where residents have less access to medical facilities, shopping areas
and public transportation, tend to reduce dwelling size earlier than those in metropolitan
regions since their δ is already negative for threshold points, AG>5 and AG>6, although
statistically insignificant.
Our overall conclusion of statistically significant but weak evidence to support the res-
idential mobility of old households is consistent with the general view of post-war housing
policies in Japan. After World War II, the government’s priority was to accommodate
the strong demand for housing of a large number of people. This strong demand was
generated by baby booms, returnees from battlefields, and those who lost homes to aerial
bombardment. To meet the demand, the Government Housing Loan Corporation (Jutaku
Kinyu Kouko, 1950-2007) was established to provide long-term, low-interest rate housing
loans to households. However, this scheme only targeted households in sound financial po-
sitions, and the poor and old were not often eligible for this scheme. Thus, the government
provided pubic housing to very poor households, and the Japan Financing Corporation
(Nihon Jutaku Kodan) was established in 1955 to help relatively poor households own
18
houses.11
In 1966, the government launched a 5-year plan to provide “houses for each household”;
however, this plan was implemented largely by the efforts of private firms that considered
providing houses to employees to attract good workers. Therefore, the poor and elderly
were excluded from this government plan. Only in 1991 did the government recognize
that housing policies should also target the elderly (Kose 1997). Our empirical finding of
small adjustments in housing size suggests that such policy changes were inadequate to
address the housing needs of th elderly during our sample period, and indeed, this has
become a more acute socioeconomic problem today, as the number of retirees in Japan
continues to increase.
6 Conclusion
Using the comprehensive survey data on household income, savings and social back-
grounds, we identify typical characteristics of households according to residential type
during the post-bubble period. Therefore, this paper provides some information related
to residential demand factors. We find that households’ financial positions and other
economic factors are found to affect homeownership decisions in Japan. At the same
time, we suggest that several social factors are relevant to deciding on a residential type,
thereby confirming that decisions on homeownership are influenced by not only financial
situations but also by the social backgrounds of households. Thus, taking into account
previous studies focusing on the bubble period, the basic decision factors generally re-
main the same. However, unlike findings from other countries, we report that income has
a significant influence over housing choice in Japan, and moreover, there was decline in
gender differences in broad homeownership decisions during the economically depressed
period.
Furthermore, despite several imperfections in the Japanese market, there is significant
evidence that the Japanese change residences according to their needs in different stages of
life. Residential sizes tend to increase with household age, particularly when a household
is young; however, the pace of increase slows with age. Furthermore, although dwelling
sizes reduce in the late life cycle, it remains larger than in most younger periods. Several
11It has been known as Urban Renaissance Agency (Toshi Saise Kikou) since 2004.
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statistical specifications confirm this weak form of the hump-shaped relationship between
household age and dwelling size. We discuss that this finding is consistent with post-war
housing policies.
Such findings have important policy implications. As the Japanese society is rapidly
aging and the population is declining, it is expected that the demand for medium-sized
residences is going to be stronger in theory. In this regard, the government has imple-
mented public policies focusing on housing elderly people in Japan since 1991 (e.g., Kose
1997), and directed to increase the number of newly built houses with barrier-free fea-
tures. Nevertheless, given our finding of little reaction of the elderly to such policies
during the lost decades, the demand for such properties may not become as strong as
expected. Rather, the renovation of residences that meets the needs of the elderly should
have a higher priority, rather than building new houses for them. Such a policy is more
promising to reduce a mismatch between the demand and supply sides of the housing
market, and in this area, public support can help to implement very effective housing
policies in Japan. This implication is reinforced by weak economic recovery that does not
seem to improve the financial status of most consumers in the foreseeable future. Finally,
needless to say, as discussed in the Introduction, amendments to a legal framework related
to real estates are urgent agendas for encouraging the transaction of owned houses and
thereby facilitating increases in the mobility of retired people.
Appendix
Using the notations used in the main text, the probability of i choosing j can be expressed
in the MNP framework as
Prob(vi1 ≤ 0, . . . , viJ−1 ≤ 0) = 1
(2pi)
(J−1)
2 |Σ| 12
∫ −λi1
−∞
. . .
∫ −λiJ−1
−∞
exp
(
−1
2
z′Σ−1z
)
dz (7)
We have used STATA to compute the MNP statistics, which use the Gaussian quadrature
approximation for the integral in the above equation.
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Table 3: Financial positions of consumers by type of houses
Residential type (RT) Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
1. Own house Income 773.520 438.016 1 2500
Saving 1620.910 1710.479 1 9500
Debt 582.624 966.064 0 4500
2. Renting from the private sector Income 531.943 282.565 5 2500
Saving 643.656 880.189 1 9500
Debt 114.931 428.206 0 4500
3. Renting from local governments Income 458.317 267.265 71 1218
Saving 592.793 863.530 1 5000
Debt 154.537 444.861 0 2750
4. Renting from public corporations
(Kodan) or government agency (Kosha)
Income 426.067 218.114 16 1870
Saving 535.394 681.734 1 7287
Debt 67.885 247.639 0 3060
5. Renting houses as employers (Shataku
or Komuinjutaku)
Income 603.936 298.354 50 2387
Saving 951.394 1215.606 3 9500
Debt 108.154 442.098 0 4500
6. Rented accommodation provided by
companies
Income 729.747 309.952 92 2500
Saving 1071.726 1173.398 3 9500
Debt 214.725 598.476 0 4500
7. Renting share houses Income 401.389 172.156 60 1287
Saving 312.923 512.012 2 5500
Debt 58.270 253.217 0 4500
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Table 4: Household decisions on homeownership
Residential type Coef Std Err p-value Coef Std Err p-value Coef Std Err p-value
(RT) 1994 1999 2004
RT2
Age -0.254 0.005 0.000 -0.222 0.004 0.000 -0.220 0.004 0.000
Income -0.875 0.030 0.000 -0.480 0.025 0.000 -0.418 0.026 0.000
Family size -0.071 0.008 0.000 -0.125 0.007 0.000 -0.136 0.008 0.000
Saving -0.063 0.010 0.000 -0.345 0.010 0.000 -0.341 0.010 0.000
No. of workers -0.098 0.031 0.001 -0.137 0.027 0.000 -0.119 0.028 0.000
Gender 0.323 0.050 0.000 0.347 0.037 0.000 0.330 0.037 0.000
Metro 0.514 0.028 0.000 0.398 0.023 0.000 0.298 0.025 0.000
RT3
Age -0.321 0.017 0.000 -0.242 0.012 0.000 -0.279 0.013 0.000
Income -0.480 0.098 0.000 -0.175 0.093 0.058 -0.410 0.086 0.000
Family size -0.435 0.030 0.000 -0.681 0.035 0.000 -0.611 0.034 0.000
Saving -0.012 0.032 0.709 -0.261 0.031 0.000 -0.151 0.033 0.000
No. of workers -0.328 0.109 0.003 -0.243 0.104 0.019 -0.177 0.106 0.096
Gender -0.059 0.134 0.660 -0.282 0.115 0.014 -0.380 0.123 0.002
Metro -0.035 0.093 0.703 0.011 0.081 0.889 0.048 0.084 0.570
RT4
Age -0.236 0.006 0.000 -0.220 0.004 0.000 -0.209 0.004 0.000
Income -0.976 0.036 0.000 -0.739 0.029 0.000 -0.698 0.030 0.000
Family size -0.180 0.010 0.000 -0.209 0.009 0.000 -0.272 0.010 0.000
Saving -0.039 0.013 0.002 -0.262 0.012 0.000 -0.252 0.012 0.000
No. of workers -0.052 0.038 0.179 -0.098 0.033 0.003 -0.067 0.036 0.063
Gender -0.050 0.060 0.400 -0.059 0.044 0.188 -0.014 0.044 0.747
Metro 0.032 0.035 0.373 -0.027 0.029 0.349 -0.059 0.032 0.063
RT5
Age -0.255 0.008 0.000 -0.256 0.006 0.000 -0.225 0.006 0.000
Income -0.427 0.052 0.000 -0.229 0.041 0.000 -0.333 0.044 0.000
Family size -0.369 0.015 0.000 -0.390 0.013 0.000 -0.498 0.016 0.000
Saving -0.041 0.017 0.016 -0.139 0.017 0.000 -0.153 0.017 0.000
No. of workers -0.268 0.052 0.000 -0.185 0.042 0.000 -0.137 0.051 0.007
Gender -0.468 0.095 0.000 -0.178 0.062 0.004 -0.265 0.064 0.000
Metro 0.736 0.048 0.000 0.869 0.038 0.000 0.638 0.043 0.000
RT6
Age -0.275 0.006 0.000 -0.283 0.005 0.000 -0.283 0.006 0.000
Income 0.078 0.040 0.050 0.260 0.040 0.000 0.406 0.044 0.000
Family size -0.038 0.009 0.000 -0.064 0.009 0.000 -0.120 0.011 0.000
Saving -0.032 0.012 0.008 -0.110 0.016 0.000 -0.086 0.017 0.000
No. of workers -0.726 0.037 0.000 -0.729 0.035 0.000 -0.629 0.040 0.000
Gender -0.295 0.078 0.000 -0.338 0.070 0.000 -0.320 0.075 0.000
Metro 0.243 0.033 0.000 0.184 0.030 0.000 0.061 0.035 0.085
RT7
Age -0.422 0.016 0.000 -0.308 0.009 0.000 -0.301 0.009 0.000
Income -1.485 0.072 0.000 -0.512 0.057 0.000 -0.433 0.061 0.000
Family size -0.586 0.032 0.000 -0.703 0.023 0.000 -0.691 0.026 0.000
Saving 0.041 0.026 0.121 -0.485 0.020 0.000 -0.400 0.021 0.000
No. of workers -0.418 0.119 0.000 -0.726 0.089 0.000 -0.531 0.090 0.000
Gender 0.006 0.099 0.954 -0.224 0.074 0.002 -0.145 0.077 0.060
Metro 1.190 0.076 0.000 1.234 0.053 0.000 1.055 0.058 0.000
Note: Based on year 1994, 1999 and 2004. The dependent variable is residential type.
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Table 5: Marginal effects from the multinominal probit (MNP) model
Residential type Coef Std Err p-value Coef Std Err p-value Coef Std Err p-value
(RT) 1994 1999 2004
RT1
Age 0.055 0.001 0.000 0.047 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000
Income 0.135 0.005 0.000 0.077 0.004 0.000 0.061 0.003 0.000
Family size 0.024 0.001 0.000 0.033 0.001 0.000 0.034 0.001 0.000
Saving 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.052 0.002 0.000 0.045 0.001 0.000
No. of workers 0.056 0.005 0.000 0.047 0.004 0.000 0.031 0.004 0.000
Gender -0.006 0.009 0.501 -0.015 0.006 0.018 -0.017 0.005 0.001
Metro -0.077 0.005 0.000 -0.060 0.004 0.000 -0.035 0.003 0.000
RT2
Age -0.025 0.001 0.000 -0.020 0.000 0.000 -0.019 0.000 0.000
Income -0.099 0.004 0.000 -0.050 0.003 0.000 -0.039 0.003 0.000
Family size -0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.010 0.001 0.000 -0.010 0.001 0.000
Saving -0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.037 0.001 0.000 -0.033 0.001 0.000
No. of workers -0.002 0.004 0.661 -0.009 0.003 0.005 -0.008 0.003 0.004
Gender 0.047 0.006 0.000 0.045 0.004 0.000 0.037 0.004 0.000
Metro 0.058 0.003 0.000 0.042 0.003 0.000 0.029 0.002 0.000
RT3
Age -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Income -0.001 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.786 -0.001 0.000 0.001
Family size -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Saving 0.000 0.000 0.811 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084
No. of workers -0.001 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.343
Gender 0.000 0.000 0.674 -0.001 0.000 0.016 -0.001 0.000 0.003
Metro -0.001 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.694
RT4
Age -0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.008 0.000 0.000
Income -0.054 0.002 0.000 -0.043 0.002 0.000 -0.034 0.002 0.000
Family size -0.010 0.001 0.000 -0.011 0.001 0.000 -0.012 0.001 0.000
Saving -0.002 0.001 0.050 -0.013 0.001 0.000 -0.010 0.001 0.000
No. of workers 0.003 0.002 0.209 -0.001 0.002 0.571 -0.001 0.002 0.763
Gender -0.004 0.004 0.300 -0.005 0.003 0.048 -0.002 0.002 0.358
Metro -0.007 0.002 0.003 -0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.007 0.002 0.000
RT5
Age -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000
Income -0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.012 -0.004 0.001 0.000
Family size -0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.000
Saving -0.001 0.000 0.144 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000
No. of workers -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.014 -0.001 0.001 0.126
Gender -0.012 0.002 0.000 -0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.001 0.000
Metro 0.016 0.001 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.000
RT6
Age -0.015 0.000 0.000 -0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.000
Income 0.024 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.000
Family size 0.000 0.001 0.711 0.000 0.000 0.505 -0.002 0.000 0.000
Saving -0.001 0.001 0.141 -0.001 0.001 0.112 0.000 0.001 0.719
No. of workers -0.052 0.003 0.000 -0.034 0.002 0.000 -0.020 0.001 0.000
Gender -0.025 0.006 0.000 -0.019 0.003 0.000 -0.012 0.002 0.000
Metro 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.894
RT7
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Family size 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Saving 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. of workers 0.000 0.000 0.026 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Gender 0.000 0.000 0.887 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.038
Metro 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Note: See Table 4.
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Table 6: Owing or renting a house
Coef Std Err p-value Coef Std Err p-value Coef Std Err p-value
1994 1999 2004
Probit estimation
Age -0.256 0.005 0.000 -0.202 0.004 0.000 -0.189 0.004 0.000
Income -0.504 0.021 0.000 -0.394 0.017 0.000 -0.361 0.018 0.000
Family size -0.271 0.008 0.000 -0.233 0.007 0.000 -0.241 0.008 0.000
Saving -0.031 0.006 0.000 -0.186 0.007 0.000 -0.194 0.007 0.000
No. of workers -0.261 0.020 0.000 -0.213 0.017 0.000 -0.165 0.019 0.000
Gender -0.126 0.035 0.000 -0.027 0.026 0.287 -0.005 0.025 0.849
Metro 0.149 0.019 0.000 0.184 0.015 0.000 0.126 0.016 0.000
Mortgage rate 0.474 0.012 0.000 0.581 0.016 0.000 0.496 0.018 0.000
Occupation
2. Employees in the public
sector
0.020 0.024 0.409 0.003 0.020 0.884 0.064 0.022 0.004
3. Merchants -0.145 0.027 0.000 -0.068 0.027 0.011 0.037 0.029 0.193
4. Owners of private
companies
-0.248 0.097 0.010 -0.328 0.031 0.000 -0.223 0.033 0.000
5. Employees in
agricultural forestry
industries and fisheries
-1.415 0.140 0.000 -0.056 0.088 0.523 -0.071 0.091 0.437
6. Owners of corporations -0.220 0.060 0.000 -1.391 0.105 0.000 -1.066 0.099 0.000
7. Self employed -0.385 0.086 0.000 -0.143 0.056 0.010 -0.071 0.063 0.256
8. Other occupations -0.458 0.245 0.062 -0.109 0.072 0.128 0.070 0.071 0.323
9. No work 0.032 0.108 0.767 -0.128 0.076 0.094 -0.169 0.089 0.059
10. Family business -0.337 0.044 0.000 -0.313 0.031 0.000 -0.187 0.032 0.000
Constant 1.958 0.050 0.000 1.398 0.040 0.000 1.178 0.042 0.000
Marginal effect
Age -0.071 0.001 0.000 -0.053 0.001 0.000 -0.043 0.001 0.000
Income -0.140 0.006 0.000 -0.102 0.004 0.000 -0.081 0.004 0.000
Family size -0.075 0.002 0.000 -0.060 0.002 0.000 -0.054 0.002 0.000
Saving -0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.048 0.002 0.000 -0.044 0.002 0.000
No. of workers -0.072 0.005 0.000 -0.055 0.005 0.000 -0.037 0.004 0.000
Gender -0.035 0.010 0.000 -0.007 0.007 0.287 -0.001 0.006 0.849
Metro 0.041 0.005 0.000 0.048 0.004 0.000 0.028 0.004 0.000
Mortgage rate 0.131 0.004 0.000 0.151 0.004 0.000 0.112 0.004 0.000
Occupation
2. Employees in the public
sector
0.006 0.007 0.408 0.001 0.006 0.884 0.016 0.006 0.004
3. Merchants -0.042 0.008 0.000 -0.020 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.196
4. Owners of private
companies
-0.069 0.024 0.004 -0.084 0.008 0.000 -0.049 0.007 0.000
5. Employees in
agricultural forestry
industries and fisheries
-0.218 0.008 0.000 -0.016 0.025 0.514 -0.017 0.021 0.421
6. Owners of corporations -0.062 0.016 0.000 -0.205 0.006 0.000 -0.143 0.006 0.000
7. Self employed -0.101 0.019 0.000 -0.040 0.015 0.007 -0.017 0.014 0.242
8. Other occupations -0.116 0.049 0.018 -0.031 0.020 0.112 0.018 0.019 0.338
9. No work 0.010 0.034 0.769 -0.036 0.020 0.078 -0.038 0.018 0.039
10. Family business -0.090 0.011 0.000 -0.081 0.008 0.000 -0.042 0.007 0.000
Note: The dependent variable is binary and equal to ”0” for homeowners and ”1” for borrowers.
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Table 7: The determinants of the size of residence
Mean Std. Dev. MCSE Median 95% confidence interval
Standard linear model
Age 0.166 0.001 0.000 0.166 0.163 0.169
Age2 -0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
Income 0.139 0.003 0.000 0.139 0.134 0.144
Family size 0.112 0.001 0.000 0.112 0.110 0.114
Saving 0.047 0.001 0.000 0.047 0.045 0.049
No. of workers 0.044 0.003 0.000 0.043 0.038 0.049
Gender -0.020 0.004 0.000 -0.020 -0.029 -0.012
Metro -0.221 0.002 0.000 -0.221 -0.225 -0.216
Constant 5.818 0.004 0.001 5.819 5.810 5.826
sigma2 0.196 0.001 0.000 0.196 0.194 0.197
Hierarchical model
Age 0.167 0.002 0.000 0.167 0.163 0.172
Age2 -0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
Income 0.137 0.003 0.000 0.137 0.131 0.142
Family size 0.115 0.001 0.000 0.115 0.113 0.117
Saving 0.048 0.001 0.000 0.048 0.046 0.050
No. of workers 0.042 0.003 0.000 0.042 0.037 0.048
Gender -0.021 0.005 0.000 -0.021 -0.030 -0.012
Metro -0.219 0.003 0.000 -0.219 -0.224 -0.214
Constant 5.871 0.059 0.010 5.862 5.779 5.998
1994 -0.114 0.058 0.010 -0.105 -0.244 -0.024
1999 -0.060 0.058 0.010 -0.050 -0.188 0.030
2004 -0.022 0.058 0.010 -0.012 -0.151 0.068
U0:sigma2 0.044 0.186 0.004 0.017 0.003 0.222
sigma2 0.195 0.001 0.000 0.195 0.193 0.196
Note: The dependent variable is residential size, and the MCSE is the Monte Carlo standard error.
Estimated by the Gibbs sampling method.
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Table 8: Difference-in-differences
Coef. Std. Err. p-value Coef. Std. Err. p-value Coef. Std. Err. p-value
1994 → 2004 AG>5 Robust AG>6 AG>7
AG 0.319 0.006 0.000 0.318 0.006 0.000 0.338 0.007 0.000
Time 0.192 0.006 0.000 0.183 0.005 0.000 0.193 0.004 0.000
AG*Time 0.004 0.007 0.561 0.008 0.007 0.284 -0.044 0.008 0.000
Metro -0.232 0.004 0.000 -0.234 0.004 0.000 -0.232 0.004 0.000
Gender -0.016 0.007 0.017 0.001 0.007 0.896 -0.002 0.007 0.738
Family size 0.119 0.002 0.000 0.119 0.002 0.000 0.110 0.002 0.000
Income 0.158 0.004 0.000 0.179 0.004 0.000 0.179 0.004 0.000
Saving 0.050 0.001 0.000 0.052 0.001 0.000 0.060 0.001 0.000
No. of workers 0.044 0.004 0.000 0.068 0.004 0.000 0.085 0.004 0.000
Constant 6.291 0.009 0.000 6.325 0.008 0.000 6.383 0.008 0.000
AG>8 AG>9 AG>10
AG 0.356 0.007 0.000 0.331 0.009 0.000 0.302 0.013 0.000
Time 0.195 0.004 0.000 0.182 0.004 0.000 0.167 0.004 0.000
AG*Time -0.098 0.009 0.000 -0.109 0.012 0.000 -0.138 0.018 0.000
Metro -0.233 0.004 0.000 -0.237 0.004 0.000 -0.240 0.004 0.000
Gender -0.011 0.007 0.121 -0.023 0.007 0.001 -0.033 0.007 0.000
Family size 0.099 0.002 0.000 0.090 0.002 0.000 0.084 0.002 0.000
Income 0.176 0.004 0.000 0.165 0.004 0.000 0.156 0.004 0.000
Saving 0.067 0.001 0.000 0.072 0.001 0.000 0.074 0.001 0.000
No. of workers 0.089 0.004 0.000 0.084 0.004 0.000 0.077 0.004 0.000
Constant 6.448 0.008 0.000 6.519 0.008 0.000 6.572 0.007 0.000
1994 → 1999 AG>5 AG>6 AG>7
AG 0.323 0.006 0.000 0.328 0.006 0.000 0.352 0.007 0.000
Time 0.096 0.006 0.000 0.093 0.005 0.000 0.096 0.004 0.000
AG*Time 0.026 0.007 0.000 0.029 0.007 0.000 0.018 0.008 0.021
Metro -0.240 0.004 0.000 -0.241 0.004 0.000 -0.238 0.004 0.000
Gender -0.017 0.007 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.265 0.027 0.007 0.000
Family size 0.126 0.002 0.000 0.131 0.002 0.000 0.122 0.002 0.000
Income 0.146 0.004 0.000 0.174 0.004 0.000 0.206 0.004 0.000
Saving 0.057 0.002 0.000 0.056 0.002 0.000 0.058 0.002 0.000
No. of workers 0.037 0.004 0.000 0.057 0.004 0.000 0.091 0.004 0.000
Constant 6.271 0.009 0.000 6.289 0.008 0.000 6.332 0.008 0.000
AG>8 AG>9 AG>10
AG 0.377 0.007 0.000 0.353 0.009 0.000 0.321 0.013 0.000
Time 0.108 0.004 0.000 0.106 0.004 0.000 0.099 0.004 0.000
AG*Time -0.033 0.009 0.000 -0.050 0.011 0.000 -0.062 0.016 0.000
Metro -0.240 0.004 0.000 -0.246 0.004 0.000 -0.252 0.004 0.000
Gender 0.022 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.756 -0.011 0.008 0.145
Family size 0.110 0.002 0.000 0.098 0.002 0.000 0.091 0.002 0.000
Income 0.205 0.004 0.000 0.187 0.004 0.000 0.170 0.004 0.000
Saving 0.067 0.002 0.000 0.076 0.002 0.000 0.082 0.002 0.000
No. of workers 0.107 0.004 0.000 0.103 0.004 0.000 0.093 0.004 0.000
Constant 6.396 0.008 0.000 6.477 0.008 0.000 6.540 0.007 0.000
Note: The difference-in-differences estimation results for 1994 & 2004 and 1994 & 1999. The heading,
AG>5, indicates the treatment group (elder people), and the control group is AG≤5 (younger people)
in this example. The robust standard error (Std. Err.) is reported.
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Table 9: Difference-in-differences (Metro vs. Non metropolitan areas)
1994 → 2004 Coef. Std. Err. p-value Coef. Std. Err. p-value Coef. Std. Err. p-value
1) Metro AG>5 AG>6 AG>7
AG 0.319 0.009 0.000 0.326 0.010 0.000 0.359 0.011 0.000
Time 0.201 0.009 0.000 0.194 0.007 0.000 0.210 0.007 0.000
AG*Time 0.025 0.012 0.034 0.032 0.012 0.007 -0.026 0.013 0.046
Gender 0.014 0.011 0.233 0.034 0.012 0.003 0.033 0.012 0.004
Family size 0.147 0.003 0.000 0.152 0.003 0.000 0.145 0.003 0.000
Income 0.176 0.006 0.000 0.197 0.006 0.000 0.196 0.006 0.000
Saving 0.049 0.002 0.000 0.051 0.002 0.000 0.061 0.002 0.000
No. of workers 0.004 0.006 0.507 0.025 0.006 0.000 0.047 0.006 0.000
Constant 5.970 0.014 0.000 5.984 0.013 0.000 6.029 0.013 0.000
AG>8 AG>9 AG>10
AG 0.397 0.012 0.000 0.384 0.015 0.000 0.381 0.022 0.000
Time 0.216 0.006 0.000 0.205 0.006 0.000 0.190 0.006 0.000
AG*Time -0.103 0.015 0.000 -0.130 0.020 0.000 -0.176 0.032 0.000
Gender 0.024 0.012 0.047 0.015 0.012 0.208 0.005 0.012 0.656
Family size 0.133 0.003 0.000 0.122 0.003 0.000 0.114 0.003 0.000
Income 0.194 0.006 0.000 0.183 0.006 0.000 0.175 0.006 0.000
Saving 0.069 0.002 0.000 0.075 0.002 0.000 0.078 0.002 0.000
No. of workers 0.057 0.006 0.000 0.054 0.006 0.000 0.047 0.006 0.000
Constant 6.097 0.013 0.000 6.169 0.012 0.000 6.224 0.012 0.000
2) Non-metro AG>5 AG>6 AG>7
AG 0.315 0.008 0.000 0.311 0.008 0.000 0.325 0.008 0.000
Time 0.183 0.007 0.000 0.174 0.006 0.000 0.181 0.006 0.000
AG*Time -0.004 0.010 0.649 -0.003 0.009 0.726 -0.053 0.010 0.000
Gender -0.033 0.008 0.000 -0.018 0.008 0.036 -0.023 0.009 0.008
Family size 0.101 0.002 0.000 0.099 0.002 0.000 0.088 0.002 0.000
Income 0.145 0.005 0.000 0.164 0.005 0.000 0.166 0.005 0.000
Saving 0.050 0.002 0.000 0.052 0.002 0.000 0.060 0.002 0.000
No. of workers 0.075 0.005 0.000 0.102 0.005 0.000 0.115 0.005 0.000
Constant 6.346 0.011 0.000 6.389 0.010 0.000 6.454 0.010 0.000
AG>8 AG>9 AG>10
AG 0.331 0.009 0.000 0.297 0.011 0.000 0.253 0.016 0.000
Time 0.181 0.005 0.000 0.166 0.005 0.000 0.151 0.005 0.000
AG*Time -0.094 0.011 0.000 -0.094 0.014 0.000 -0.114 0.022 0.000
Gender -0.031 0.009 0.000 -0.046 0.009 0.000 -0.055 0.009 0.000
Family size 0.079 0.002 0.000 0.071 0.002 0.000 0.065 0.002 0.000
Income 0.162 0.005 0.000 0.151 0.005 0.000 0.141 0.005 0.000
Saving 0.065 0.002 0.000 0.069 0.002 0.000 0.072 0.002 0.000
No. of workers 0.116 0.005 0.000 0.109 0.005 0.000 0.101 0.005 0.000
Constant 6.518 0.009 0.000 6.586 0.009 0.000 6.636 0.009 0.000
Note: The difference-in-differences estimation results for 1994 & 2004 and 1994 & 1999. The heading,
AG>5, indicates the treatment group (elder people), and the control group is AG≤5 (younger people)
in this example. The robust standard error (Std. Err.) is reported.
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Figure 1: Histogram of key variables
Note: Statistics based on the 1999 survey.
Figure 2: Histogram of income and saving
Note: Statistics based on 1999.
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Figure 3: Average residential size
Note: The average dwelling size of each age group based on all three year observations.
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Figure 4: MCMC results
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Figure 5: MCMC results, Continued
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